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This paper evaluates the impacts of low income housing developments on the neigh-
borhoods in which they are built. A discontinuity in the formula determining the
allocation of tax credits to low income housing developments as a function of neigh-
borhood characteristics generates pseudo-random assignment in the number of low
income housing units built in similar sets of census tracts. Estimates indicate that
a 30 percent increase in the tax credit generates an increase of approximately 6 low
income housing units on a base of 9 units per tract. We ￿nd that low income hous-
ing developments cause median household incomes to decline by about 5 percent
in neighborhoods near the 30th percentile of the income distribution and this e⁄ect
decays monotonically with distance. Further, we provide evidence that developers
di⁄erentially select gentrifying neighborhoods as locations for their developments.
Failure to account for this selection can lead to faulty conclusions about the impact
of these developments on local housing values.1 Introduction
A long literature going back to Schelling (1971) attempts to understand the extent
to which neighborhoods change as a result of immigration of the poor. Endogenous
sorting of households across neighborhoods makes it di¢ cult to empirically isolate
new neighbor e⁄ects from other factors that might drive neighborhood gentri￿cation
and decline. In this paper, we empirically examine the impacts of the in￿ ux of the
poor on surrounding neighborhoods. To achieve exogenous variation in the char-
acteristics of new neighbors, we exploit variation in the location of poor households
generated by rules governing the allocation of federally funded low income hous-
ing tax credit (LIHTC) units across space. In addition, our analysis provides new
evidence on the local impacts of this important federal housing program.
Since its inception in 1986, the LIHTC program has subsidized the construction
and renovation of over one million housing units in the United States. The federal
government has committed to spending about $3 billion per year on the program in
each year since 1986. Table 1 shows trends in the contribution of LIHTC subsidized
housing construction to the housing stock. The growth in the number of LIHTC
units during the sample period is signi￿cant. Developers established 475 thousand
LIHTC units between 1993 and 1999, making up 2.3 percent of the rental housing
stock at the end of the period. By 2003, LIHTC units accounted for 3.5 percent of
rental units in the U.S. Meanwhile, the number of public housing units has declined
from a peak of 2.4 million in 1995 to 1.8 million in 2003, representing 5.3 percent
of rental housing units nationwide. The LIHTC expansion compensated for about
half of the decline of over 20% in the stock of public housing units between 1993 and
2003. With few new public housing projects expected to be built in the future and
a recent expansion in LIHTC funding, the LIHTC is now the primary project based
federal housing program.
We ￿nd that low income housing developments cause median household incomes
within 1 km of the project site to decline by about 5 percent in neighborhoods near
the 30th percentile of the income distribution. In addition, we show that owner
turnover rates are higher near new LIHTC projects. These e⁄ects decay approxi-
1mately monotonically with distance. Finally, we provide evidence that developers
di⁄erentially select gentrifying neighborhoods as locations for their developments.
Failure to account for this selection can lead to faulty conclusions about the impact
of these developments on local housing values.
Isolating causal e⁄ects of LIHTC developments requires exogenous variation in
the allocation of developments across space. To achieve pseudo-random assignment
in the location of developments, we exploit a discontinuity in the size of the tax
credit and the probability that proposed developments receive the credit based on
characteristics of the census tracts in which projects are proposed. Because these
characteristics are measured using data from the 1990 census, the tracts falling on
either side of the cuto⁄ above which extra incentives are provided for LIHTC devel-
opments were not identi￿able prior to 1990. Using a regression discontinuity design,
we demonstrate a signi￿cant response in subsidized housing supply as a result of
tax credits. Estimates indicate that the 30 percent increase in the tax credit is
associated with an increase of 6 low income housing units on a base of 9 units per
tract.
The cost of the regression discontinuity approach taken here is that without strong
and probably unreasonable assumptions about the homogeneity of treatment e⁄ects
as a function of neighborhood characteristics, it only allows us to make statements
about the impact of low income housing developments for areas that are fairly poor,
though not extremely poor. A model presented below demonstrates that the in-
centives of developers to build low income versus market rate housing may di⁄er
markedly by local economic conditions. Data presented below indicate that poorer
tracts receive more low income units on average than richer tracts, and only part of
this pattern is explained by higher tax incentives to develop in lower income tracts.
This paper builds on a body of research assessing the impact of subsidized housing
on neighborhoods. Schwartz et al. (forthcoming) examine the impact of housing
developments in New York City. Using detailed repeat sales data to measure housing
values, they ￿nd that while low income housing developments are located in relatively
depressed neighborhoods, they have large positive e⁄ects on local housing values.
Furthermore, they ￿nd larger e⁄ects for more depressed neighborhoods. Green
2et al. (2002) present weak evidence that LIHTC projects in Milwaukee decrease
property values but show mixed evidence for other areas.
Cummings & DiPasquale (1999) and McClure (2000) examine the extent to which
the LIHTC e¢ ciently ￿nances new housing construction and serves its intended low
income population. They ￿nd that over time the tax credit dollars that end up fund-
ing construction and rehabilitation have increased as state authorities have added
cost oversight. Cummings & DiPasquale provide evidence that LIHTC projects that
received the higher tax credits are more costly to develop than other similar projects.
They also present evidence of increasing returns to scale. Finally, they demonstrate
that LIHTC residents are likely su¢ ciently wealthy to rent unsubsidized apartments
in poor neighborhoods. We provide further evidence to this e⁄ect.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the LIHTC program. Section
3 proposes a model that provides intuition about the incentives faced by LIHTC
developers. Section 4 discusses the data and empirical methodology. Section 5
presents estimates of the impact of the LIHTC program on housing supply. In
Section 5, we demonstrate that the discontinuity in the size of the tax credit and in
the probability of granting the credit generates a signi￿cant response in the number of
new low income units constructed for census tracts with otherwise similar attributes.
Section 6 evaluates the impacts of subsidized rental units on neighborhood outcomes
and argues that responses are likely from the demand side of the housing market.
Finally, Section 7 discusses implications for policy and concludes.
2 The LIHTC Program
The LIHTC program was established as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 to en-
courage redevelopment of poor areas with quality rental housing. In every year,
Congress allocates to states a ￿xed amount per resident exclusively for tax credits to
low income housing developers to be paid out over the subsequent 10 years.1 Poten-
tial projects must meet one of two criteria to be eligible for the tax credit. Either at
1Congress allocated $1.25 per resident all years 1986 to 2001 except 1989 when it allocated $0.93.
In 2001, funding was increased to $1.75 per resident.
3least 20 percent of the units must be occupied by tenants earning below 50 percent
of the Area Median Gross Income (AMGI) or at least 40 percent of units must be
occupied by tenants earning below 60 percent of the AMGI.2 Annual rents on these
units cannot exceed 30 percent of the relevant income limit. Since the program￿ s
inception, over 95 percent of units in projects supported by the program quali￿ed
as low income, implying that the second criterion represents the preponderance of
projects. The rent requirement binds for 15 years, after which some less restrictive
rent restriction is required for an additional 15 years. The cost of constructing or
rehabilitating the rent restricted units (excluding land) is known as the ￿quali￿ed
basis".
The base level of the tax credit is intended to have a discounted value of 30
percent of the quali￿ed basis for existing projects or federally subsidized projects and
70 percent for new construction or substantial rehabilitation.3 In 1989, Congress
passed legislation to increase the tax credit by 30 percent for projects developed
in ￿quali￿ed" census tracts (QCTs) or ￿di¢ cult development areas" (DDAs). A
census tract counts as quali￿ed if 50% of its households have incomes below 60%
of AMGI, with the restriction that no more than 20% of the population of any
metropolitan area may live in a quali￿ed tract. Tracts with the highest fraction
eligible get priority for assignment to quali￿ed status. Because of this population
restriction, only 96 percent of metropolitan census tracts above the cuto⁄ qualify.
Tracts￿quali￿ed status is assigned using decennial census data, and is thus only
revised every 10 years. The 50 percent threshold is the cuto⁄ that we exploit in
this paper to provide exogenous variation in low income housing units across sets of
very similar census tracts. Metropolitan areas with the highest ratio of fair market
rent to AMGI up to 20 percent of the national urban population qualify as di¢ cult
development areas. While we look at changes in outcomes between 1990 and 2000,
we focus on exogenous variation in LIHTC developments built between 1994 and
2The AMGI is calculated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development for all
metropolitan areas and counties using data from the Internal Revenue Service, the American Hous-
ing Survey and the decennial Census of Population and Housing.
3Each year, this amounts to about 4% or 9% of eligible basis tax credit over the course of 10
years.
41999 because 1994 was the ￿rst full year in which quali￿ed status was assigned using
1990 census tabulations. Further, we only observe the universe of LIHTC projects
built after 1994.
In each year of the program, all but a few states have allocated all of their avail-
able LIHTC money.4 As such, within the guidelines explained above, the states
have some latitude on whether to accept projects proposed by developers into the
program. Each state is required to have a ￿Quali￿ed Allocation Plan" (QAP) to
determine whether applications for developments merit receiving the tax credit. In
most states, the QAP designates the number of points to be allocated for various ele-
ments of each project proposal. The points are added up and projects are selected in
order until the money runs out. While selection criteria di⁄er by state, they include
location, local housing demand conditions, whether funding can be shared with other
government programs, resident characteristics, project activities, building character-
istics and costs. As of 2001, 29 states gave extra points to projects proposed for
tracts with quali￿ed status, independent of DDA status, as part of the location cri-
teria.5 In addition, a large fraction of states allocated extra points for development
proposals that had fewer units than average. Most states give priority to rehabilita-
tion over new construction to the point that almost all proposed rehabilitations get
funded.
Table 2 shows trends in LIHTC subsidized new construction and total renter
occupied units between 1990 and 2000 as a function of the fraction of households
eligible to pay reduced rents. Table 2 demonstrates that LIHTC subsidized rental
units are more concentrated in poor areas. While only 9 percent of the growth
in rental units between 1990 and 2000 in tracts with between 0 and 40 percent
of households eligible for reduced rents was LIHTC subsidized, 49 percent of the
increase in 51-60 percent eligible tracts was LIHTC subsidized. In the poorest
areas, while the aggregate stock of rental units declined by 130 thousand units, the
stock of LIHTC units increased by 27 thousand units.
One component of a thorough analysis of the welfare consequences of subsidized
4States are allowed to roll over any unused funds for one year.
5Gustafson & Walker (2002) provide a summary of state QAPs in 1990 and 2001.
5housing units for poor households is to estimate the number of units that would
have been built absent the subsidy, also known as ￿crowd out". Table 2 shows
that even in the richest areas, 64 percent of rental apartments in the private market
rented at below LIHTC regulated rents in 2000, up from 49 percent in 1990. In
the poorest areas, the market rate was below the regulated rent for 85 percent of
apartments rented in 2000, up from 80 percent in 1990. Given these rents and
the fact that most LIHTC renters have incomes just below the eligibility cuto⁄ of
60 percent of AMGI (Wallace, 1995), it appears likely that signi￿cant crowd-out
of market provided units exists due to LIHTC units. This suggestive evidence of
signi￿cant crowd-out is consistent with that reported in Sinai & Waldfogel (2005),
who ￿nd that project based developments including public housing exhibit about
70 percent crowd-out. We present further evidence in support of almost complete
crowd out in Section 6.
Table 3 presents summary statistics about LIHTC developments, demographics
and housing characteristics for the same regions as those examined in Table 2. The
top part of the table demonstrates a large jump of 7.1 in the average number of
LIHTC subsidized units established between 1994 and 1999 across the tax credit
discontinuity. More projects partly accounts for this di⁄erence, but most of it can
be explained by the fact that projects installed in tracts that barely qualify have 26.9
more units on average than projects in tracts just below the discontinuity.
In order for the regression discontinuity strategy to yield consistent parameter
estimates, unobserved tract characteristics that in￿ uence outcomes of interest must
not vary discontinuously across the policy threshold. We can partially evaluate
the validity of this assumption by examining the extent to which observable tract
characteristics vary across the threshold. The lower two sections of Table 3 show
demographics and housing characteristics in 1990 as a function of neighborhood
incomes. The ￿nal column of Table 3 shows estimated regression discontinuity
(RD) coe¢ cients at the quali￿ed status threshold controlling for county ￿xed e⁄ects
with the given observable characteristics as dependent variables. Consistent with the
raw data, few observables have large estimated RD coe¢ cients. Most demographic
and housing characteristics vary insigni￿cantly across the discontinuity at 50 percent
6eligibility. Of the variables examined, only population, total housing units, log
median household income and the fraction of owner occupied housing units that
were detached di⁄er signi￿cantly across the quali￿ed threshold and their magnitudes
are small. In order to maintain continuity of baseline variables across the tax credit
discontinuity, we always control for county ￿xed e⁄ects in the empirical analysis to
follow. We directly handle the smaller initial population and number of housing units
in quali￿ed tracts in the estimation methodology developed in Section 4. Table 3
also characterizes the neighborhoods near the QCT eligibility threshold, from which
we obtain exogenous variation in LIHTC developments. These neighborhoods have
an average poverty rate of 25 percent, are about 30 percent black and 60 percent
high school graduate. Rents are about $395 per month as measured in 1990 dollars.
3 The LIHTC Development Decision
In this section, we model the decision to develop LIHTC projects faced by a pro￿t
maximizing developer. The key endogenous elements of the model are LIHTC
project location and size. The model generates a positive supply response to the tax
credit. In addition, it provides a framework for analyzing the potential endogenous
selection of LIHTC developments to areas with higher expected future housing values.
Following presentation of the model, we demonstrate that as predicted by the model,
the amount of LIHTC development empirically depends on prevailing local housing
market characteristics.
3.1 The Model
We consider a two-period model. In the ￿rst period, LIHTC units rent for the
minimum of market rent r1 and LIHTC regulated rent. In the second period, the
expected discounted rent net of maintenance cost for all units is r2. The marginal
cost of constructing or rehabilitating each unit is c, which is potentially reduced by
the tax credit of t percent. Applications for the tax credit cost K to potential
LIHTC developers. Each area has N sites for which developers can either propose
7low income housing developments or build market rate units.6 Developers receive
a ￿xed cost draw f from the distribution G(f) for each potential development site.
The ￿xed cost parameter includes land preparation and acquisition costs, which
include the opportunity cost of developing market rate units. Therefore, it may vary
systematically with r1. Assuming that f is random captures the idea that potential
development sites di⁄er in terrain or the size of existing structures to be demolished
or rehabilitated.
The government accepts LIHTC tax credit proposals with some probability P(q;t),
where q is the number of units proposed and t is the tax credit that varies with qual-
i￿ed status. State quali￿ed action plans indicate that smaller projects and projects
located in quali￿ed tracts are preferred. As such, we assume that Pq < 0 and Pt > 0.
Based on the observation that over 95% of total units constructed in LIHTC subsi-
dized projects are low income, we allow accepted projects to include no market rate
units.
In areas where LIHTC regulated rents are at or above market rents, a potential
developer￿ s expected pro￿t function at each site is given by
￿(q;t) = P(q;t)[q(r1 ￿ c(1 ￿ t) + r2) ￿ f] ￿ K: (1)
The developer￿ s ￿rst-order condition is
Pq[q(r1 ￿ c(1 ￿ t) + r2) ￿ f] + P[r1 ￿ c(1 ￿ t) + r2] = 0: (2)
The probability a project proves pro￿table is therefore
￿(q;t) = G
￿





Because the support of G is over higher values of / f in higher rent areas, the prob-
ability any potential development site in these areas proves pro￿table for LIHTC
development may be very low. This prediction is roughly consistent with data in
6In the empirical work below, we treat either census tracts or census blocks as having N available
development sites.
8Table 3 showing that the prevalence of LIHTC developments is low in rich neighbor-
hoods.7
We now characterize how the developer￿ s choice of project size, the probability of
investment, and the total number of observed installed units in a location respond
to quali￿ed status through the tax credit. While in reality quali￿ed tracts receive
a 30 percent higher tax credit, we model the move from unquali￿ed to quali￿ed
as a marginal change in order analyze the relevant incentives with a minimum of
notational cost. The analytical results presented below can be derived using a similar
logic in the discrete case.
Not surprisingly, the number of units per project likely responds positively to





Pqt[q￿(r1 ￿ c(1 ￿ t) + r2) ￿ f] + Pqcq￿ + Pt(r1 ￿ c(1 ￿ t) + r2) + Pc
Pqq[q￿(r1 ￿ c(1 ￿ t) + r2) ￿ f] + 2Pq[r1 ￿ c(1 ￿ t) + r2]
(4)
which is positive if the magnitude of Pq is su¢ ciently small and Pqt ￿ 0. Developers
face a trade-o⁄ in their choice of q, since increasing the number of units increases
pro￿ts conditional on acceptance yet reduces the likelihood of proposal acceptance.
The terms in the numerator capture how the tax credit alters this trade-o⁄, as
increasing the tax credit increases the pro￿t per unit and reduces the adverse e⁄ects
of size if Pqt ￿ 0. In the extreme case, if the base number of units and marginal cost
are large, it may be optimal to reduce the number of units proposed.











The investment response combines two e⁄ects. First, higher tax credits indicate
a higher per unit pro￿t, increasing the probability that a project￿ s expected pro￿t
clears the ￿xed cost hurdle. Second, the probability of project acceptance rises, and
7Locally funded incentives and legal restrictions such as inclusionary zoning ordinances likely
generate the small number of LIHTC developments in high rent census tracts.
9the importance of this depends on the size of the application cost.8 In places with
no preferences for projects located in quali￿ed tracts, the second term in brackets
disappears. By utilizing data on applications, we will examine the probability that
projects are proposed as a function of the tax credit, as expressed in (5).
The actual number of installed projects is given by I = NP(q;t)￿(q;t). The
response of I to the tax credit depends on the probability of a project being proposed
and the probability it is chosen given that an application was submitted:
@I
@t




Given that units per project q￿ is increasing in the tax credit, we see that the total
number of low income units should also be greater in quali￿ed tracts.
The model indicates that we should see a positive response of applications, in-
stalled projects, and installed units to the tax credit. A ￿nal important implication
of the model is that the location of LIHTC developments is endogenous to expected
future rent r2. Conditional on the tax credit, LIHTC developments are more likely










As seen in (7), assessing the e⁄ects of low income housing developments on hous-
ing values requires accounting for the selection of developments into areas with higher
expected future rents. It is straightforward to see that this nonrandom selection
occurs to a greater extent in quali￿ed tracts than in other areas. That is, the mar-
ginally treated area is likely to be further down the distribution of expected future
rents than the marginal non-treated area. The next major section describes how
the regression discontinuity estimator that we employ purges our estimates of this
selection bias.
8The Envelope Theorem ensures that the term capturing the endogenous response of q is 0.
103.2 Further Empirical Observations
Table 4 provides information on the importance of LIHTC units in local housing
markets. We split the data by DDA status and by whether the state gives preference
for projects in quali￿ed areas. LIHTC units represent a less important part of
the housing stock in DDAs relative to other areas. In particular, while LIHTC
units represent 16 percent of the rental housing built between 1990 and 2000 in 40
to 50 percent eligibility tracts outside of DDAs, they represent only 10 percent in
DDAs. Across the quali￿ed threshold, LIHTC units represent 29 percent of new
rental housing outside of DDAs relative to just 15 percent inside DDAs. This gap is
not surprising given that the available tax credit is the same for both groups in this
subsample whereas DDAs have higher construction costs and a higher opportunity
cost of developing low income units, as measured by fair market rents. In addition,
Table 4 documents that LIHTC units form a particularly important part of the
housing stock in low income areas, representing 27 percent of new rental units. Near
the policy threshold, LIHTC construction accounts for 13 percent of new rental units
in areas with 40-50 percent of households income eligible and 24 percent of new rental
units in areas between 50 and 60 percent income eligible.
One potential bene￿t of LIHTC units relative to market provided units is quality.
Indeed, in most states LIHTC applications receive extra points if the proposed units
are large enough to house families. Table 5 demonstrates that this quality di⁄erence,
as measured by the number of bedrooms, is quite large. Panel A shows the distribu-
tion of bedrooms in LIHTC units while Panels B and C present analogous statistics
for rental units in census tract and micro data respectively. The distribution of bed-
rooms in LIHTC units closely resembles that observed in the broader market. The
modal LIHTC unit, representing 43 percent of the total, has two bedrooms. This
is close to the 40 percent of units in the market with two bedrooms. Similarly, 29
percent of LIHTC units have one bedroom compared with 32 percent of units in the
census. Average market rental unit sizes increases monotonically with area income.
However, LIHTC units are of similar size regardless of tract income. If the number of
bedrooms is an indicator of quality, this suggests that while the LIHTC program is
11meant to target lower income households, LIHTC housing may in fact be preferable
to surrounding units in the same neighborhood. In addition to showing that LIHTC
units are on average of higher quality than market units, Table 5 also shows that
LIHTC unit size increases across the quali￿ed threshold. We conjecture that this is
likely to be a strategic response by developers to increase the probability of project
acceptance.
4 Empirical Approach
The primary objective of this paper is to estimate the change between 1990 and 2000
in various outcomes y that have occurred in response to the treatment of low-income
projects or units x installed nearby. We ￿rst consider how to estimate parameters
of interest using tract level data. We then generalize our methodology to allow for
estimation of the distribution of causal e⁄ects as a function of distance using data
that is geographically disaggregated beyond the tract level. The ￿nal part of this
section discusses how we construct the data.
4.1 Basic Empirical Model
We endeavor to estimate the parameter ￿1 in the equation
￿yk = ￿0 + ￿1xk + ￿
0Zk + "k (8)
where k indexes some unit of geography and Zk is a vector of initial characteristics
that may in￿ uence the outcome. As argued in the previous section, estimating the
speci￿cation described by (8) using OLS regression does not generally yield consistent
estimates of ￿1 since the error term "k is unlikely to be orthogonal to the treatment xk.
The probability a project is proposed in a particular tract, and whether this proposal
is ultimately accepted, is likely to be related to some unobserved tract characteristic
that also in￿ uences the change in the outcome ￿yk. Developers and state housing
authorities likely form expectations regarding changes in a host of neighborhood
12characteristics like future rents and demographics that cannot be predicted with
variables in Z when proposing and selecting projects.
To overcome the problems in identifying ￿1 presented by the potentially en-
dogenous relationship between changes in neighborhood characteristics and LIHTC
projects, we employ a regression discontinuity design that exploits rules governing
the assignment of tax credits to projects. As described above, projects located in
quali￿ed tracts are eligible for extra tax credits and in some states are given preferen-
tial status in scoring LIHTC applications. Quali￿ed status is based on the fraction of
households in a tract with incomes of less than 60 percent of the adjusted metropol-
itan area median gross income. If greater than 50 percent of households meet this
criterion, then a tract is considered quali￿ed.9
This eligibility cuto⁄ generates a discontinuity in the likelihood that projects
located in a tract receive additional tax credits. We will begin by using the resulting
discontinuity in a ￿rst-stage speci￿cation of the number of LIHTC units. The ￿rst
stage equation implied by the regression discontinuity at the census tract level is
xi = ￿0 + ￿1Di + f(ei) + G
0Zi + ui (9)
where the running variable ei represents the fraction of households meeting the in-
come requirement and i indexes census tracts. Di = 1 if ei ￿ 0:5 and 0 otherwise.
The control function, f(ei), of the running variable is a cubic polynomial excluding
constant terms where the cuto⁄is subtracted from ei and the polynomial coe¢ cients
are allowed to di⁄er below and above the cuto⁄. The covariates captured in the
vector Z should be orthogonal to the treatment variable Di conditional on ei, and
are included as a robustness check and to improve precision. Commensurate with
the discussion of Table 3 above, we always include county ￿xed e⁄ects as part of
Z. We remain agnostic about appropriate additional controls. As such, below we
present results using several di⁄erent sets of control variables.
The reduced form relationship between the change in the tract-level outcome ￿yi
9This rule only creates a fuzzy discontinuity since at most 20 percent of metro area population
can reside in quali￿ed tracts. As a result, only 96 percent of tracts that meet the eligibility criteria
are in fact quali￿ed.
13and the eligibility for extra tax credits is given by
￿yi = ￿0 + ￿1Di + f(ei) + AZi + ￿i: (10)
Together with the estimate of ￿1, the estimate of ￿1 can be used to obtain an Indirect
Least Squares estimate of the parameter of interest, ^ ￿1 = ^ ￿1=^ ￿1. The estimated
coe¢ cient ^ ￿1 is consistent provided the error term "i does not change discontinuously
across the threshold ei = 0:5. This estimator also purges any bias arising from
selection due to missing project level data from the estimate of ￿1.
4.2 Generalizing The Geography
Evaluating the e⁄ects of LIHTC developments at the census tract level presents
several di¢ culties. If the process that generates the response of y to x operates as a
function of distance, tract level regressions may provide inconsistent estimates of the
response because not all census tracts are the same size. The wide variation in tract
sizes generates variation in the distances to projects within tracts that is akin to
a measurement error problem. Incorporating information from surrounding tracts
may also improve e¢ ciency by incorporating all useful identifying information. Data
on many outcomes including housing values are available for block groups, a more
disaggregated level of geography than census tracts. Using this more disaggregated
data allows us to more precisely measure how the treatment changes as a function
of distance.
To handle these extensions, we assume that the process generating the treatment
occurs at the census block level while the e⁄ects of the treatment occur as functions
of distance to block group centroids. We have data on outcomes at the block group
level and we observe the exact locations of LIHTC projects. De￿ne r to index rings
of width 0.5 km that are centered at each block group centroid. We aim to estimate
the vector of equations given by (11).
￿yg = ￿0 + ￿1rxgr + ￿
0Zg + "gr (11)
14where g indexes block group and xgr gives the number of units or projects in rings r
about the centroid of block group g. As with (8), equation (11) may be misspeci￿ed
due to unobserved variables correlated with xgr that in￿ uence ￿yg. To obtain ex-
ogenous variation in the number of projects in a ring, we use the tax credit rules by





Bigr(￿0 + ￿1Di + f(ei) + G
0Zi + ui) (12)
where Bigr is the number of census blocks in ring r around block group g that are in
tract i. This formulation implies that we can use
P
i(gr) BigrDi as an instrumental
variable for xgr when estimating the following equation.
￿yg =  0 +  1rxgr +
X
i(gr)
[Bigr(￿0 + f(ei) + Q
0Zi] +e ￿
0
Zg +e "g (13)
Assuming the empirical model in (9) captures the data generating process for x at
the census block level, inclusion of the aggregated polynomial control function terms
ensures that the instrument is orthogonal to the error term e "g.
The strategy outlined above allows for identi￿cation of the parameter of interest
 1r by exploiting variation in the fraction of blocks in rings around each block group
qualifying for the higher tax credit. By holding geography constant and measuring
outcomes at the block group level rather than the tract level, this strategy makes
more e¢ cient use of available information and allows for identi￿cation of a more
diverse set of treatment e⁄ects.
4.3 Data
The Department of Housing and Urban Development makes available data on LIHTC
projects placed in service from 1987 through 2003. These data provide information
regarding speci￿c project location including the geocoded project street address,
census tract, and metropolitan statistical area. In addition, these data report infor-
mation regarding the size of projects through the number of units and the number
15of units reserved for those individuals qualifying for reduced rent. For a majority of
projects, the distribution of unit size by number of bedrooms is also provided. Other
project level characteristics include the type of construction (new versus rehab), and
whether the project quali￿ed for extra tax credits through an increase in the eligible
basis.
In all, the data provide information on 24,504 projects. Unfortunately, missing
data is a signi￿cant di¢ culty. Information on project location is missing for 9.5
percent of projects, the number of units is missing for 4.9 percent of these projects,
tract quali￿ed status is missing for 9.7 percent of observations, 13.5 percent are
missing DDA status, and 37.3 percent are missing data on the number of bedrooms.
Assuming that missing information on location does not di⁄er across the 50 percent
eligibility cuto⁄, missing data problems, while regrettable, do not adversely a⁄ect
our empirical strategy.
Because the ￿rst year in which 1990 census information was used to determine
QCT status was 1993, we focus only on projects allocated in 1994 or later to allow
for lead time in project planning.10 Since the outcome variables we will examine are
partly built using 2000 census data, we further restrict our sample to projects placed
in service in 1999 or earlier. Finally, because of di⁄erent rules for the allocation of
tax credits in rural areas, we only consider projects placed in metropolitan areas.
We combine the data on LIHTC projects with census tract and block group level
data from 1990 and 2000 normalized to 1990 geography. These data provide in-
formation on demographic characteristics, housing values, and characteristics of the
housing stock. We observe relevant variables such as the number of renter and owner
occupied units, median rents, and the local vacancy rate. We use similar data from
the 1980 census normalized to 1990 tract geography to examine the relationship be-
tween the number of projects and neighborhood growth and decline. Normalizations
are done using population allocation factors derived from census block geography re-
ported by the Census Bureau. The sample used for all regressions only include areas
in census tracts with between 20 and 80 percent eligibility. This restriction leads us
to drop 29 percent of the 45,305 metropolitan area census tracts and 27 percent of
10Information on the universe of LIHTC projects is available only after 1994.
16the 166,443 block groups for which we have data. In addition, we exclude from the
sample 14,638 block groups that are greater than 4￿ in area.
One drawback to the LIHTC data is that it only contains information on projects
placed in service. An observed project is one that was both proposed and selected
by a state housing authority. To disentangle the supply decisions of ￿rms from the
preferences of state housing authorities, it is worthwhile to know about projects
that were rejected. To this end, we collected data for all 690 applications made
in California, Texas, and New Jersey in 2004 and 2005. These states host a large
number of LIHTC projects, make applications data readily available, and contain
states both with and without preferences based on QCT status. The applications
information contains location by census tract, the number of units, the Quali￿ed
Action Plan score resulting from the project evaluation, and whether the application
was accepted or rejected.
Figure 1 illustrates the nature of the data used for the analysis. It shows a
map of the North and West sides of Chicago. Figure 1 shows census tracts shaded
by eligible household fraction, block group centroids and LIHTC projects. As is
consistent with the evidence presented above, the poorer region at the lower left to
the West of the Loop received considerably more LIHTC projects than other areas.
Outside the West side, there are two distinct pockets of poor tracts. The tracts
including the Cabrini Green housing project include a cluster of projects as does the
Uptown neighborhood in the upper part of the map. Census tracts just above the
quali￿ed threshold (shaded light blue) are noticeably more likely to receive projects
than other areas. This phenomenon is particularly noticeable in Uptown. Wealthy
areas only have a few scattered projects. Figure 1 also indicates the extent to which
the use of block groups rather than census tracts improves the spatial density of the
data.
175 Housing Supply Results
5.1 Tract Level Estimates
Table 6 presents a variety of tract level "￿rst stage" estimates of the impacts of
the 30 percent additional tax credit on various measures of LIHTC housing sup-
ply. Each element of Table 6 is an estimate of ￿1 under di⁄erent speci￿cations
of (9). Panel A shows estimated impacts of the additional tax credit on number
of units, units per 1990 stock of rentals, number of projects and units per project
using data from both rehabilitation and new construction projects. Speci￿cation 1
includes only the cubic control function as explanatory variables. Conditional on
this control function, there are 6 more units per tract estimated to be caused by the
tax credit. This amounts to a 2 percent increase in the housing stock. This response
of LIHTC units comes in part because quali￿ed tracts received 0.06 more projects
conditional on the control function and in part because projects in quali￿ed tracts
had 19 additional units on average. Each estimate except that for units per project
is precisely estimated. Figure 2 plots predicted values of the cubic control functions
and average values of outcome variables within percentile bins against the fraction
of eligible households. Graphs in Figure 2 exhibit noticeable discontinuities at the
QCT eligibility threshold.11
Speci￿cations shown in columns 2-4 of Table 6 show additional analogous esti-
mates of ￿1 when more controls are included in the regression. The controls are
county ￿xed e⁄ects, distance to MSA central business districts, demographic charac-
teristics of the tract including racial composition, education, median family income,
poverty rate, and population density, and 1990 tract housing characteristics includ-
ing unit vacancy rate, rental share of units, log of total units, average building age,
average number of bedrooms, and the fraction of units comprised of detached houses,
attached units, and mobile homes. If the control function is adequately accounting
for the association between supply and the fraction of eligible households, we would
11We bootstrap the standard errors clustering at the county level. The identifying assumption
for consistent estimation of standard errors is thus independence of observations between but not
within counties.
18expect that adding further controls would have little impact on the estimated discon-
tinuity in supply at the threshold. Indeed, adding county ￿xed e⁄ects in column 3,
tract demographic controls in column 4, and tract housing characteristics in column
5 generates little change in the estimated supply discontinuity. Only the coe¢ cient
on units per project changes markedly. The impact of the additional tax credit on
this outcome is consistently estimated less precisely than the others at least in part
because only the 9.6 percent of tracts that received projects are in the estimation
sample.
Table A1 displays results of estimated regression discontinuity coe¢ cients for
placebo QCT eligibility thresholds. We show estimates of the supply speci￿cations
with the full set of controls at eligibility thresholds of 0.3, 0.4, 0.6, 0.7 and for
comparison purposes the true value of 0.5. With only a few exceptions, the estimated
discontinuity at the placebo thresholds are statistically insigni￿cant and closer to zero
than the estimates using the true eligibility threshold.
Table 6 Panels B and C display results of regressions analogous to those in Panel A
except that LIHTC projects are separated into new construction and rehabilitations
separately. While it is impossible to achieve independent exogenous variation in the
two variables using the quali￿ed status discontinuity, we show ￿rst stage results for
these two types of projects in order to better understand the type of project that
primarily drives the neighborhood level results presented in the next section.
Panel B reports the results for new construction projects. In the full speci￿cation,
we estimate that 4 additional new units are built in QCTs just above the threshold,
representing the majority of the 6 additional units of all types received by these tracts.
The other measures of supply tell a similar story. The discontinuity in normalized
new units is estimated to be 0.01 and the estimated discontinuity in new projects is
0.05. As with the results for all projects, the estimated discontinuity in new LIHTC
developments is not sensitive to the inclusion of controls for county area ￿xed e⁄ects,
or demographics and housing characteristics. Finally, the discontinuity in units per
project is slightly larger for new projects, however it is still statistically insigni￿cant.
In Panel C, we report similar estimates for rehabilitation projects. With the
exception of units per project, these estimates merely represent the di⁄erence be-
19tween the results displayed in Panels A and B. The estimated discontinuity at the
QCT threshold is statistically insigni￿cant for each measure of the supply of rehab
projects. In the full speci￿cation, tracts just above the threshold receive 2 extra re-
hab units, 0.003 more normalized rehab units, and 0.01 additional rehab projects on
average. These results indicate that approximately one quarter of the supply e⁄ect
of the QCT designation is through rehabilitations. Finally, rehab projects in tracts
meeting the QCT requirement are larger by 11 units per project, however as with
new construction this estimate is not statistically signi￿cant.
5.2 Evidence from Applications Data
The additional projects and units observed in QCTs can either be due to developers
proposing more projects or to states accepting projects with a higher probability. In
this subsection, we investigate the potential importance of these two mechanisms by
estimating the e⁄ect of QCT designation using data on applications to the LIHTC
program. If all pro￿table projects are proposed, then the response of proposed units
to the QCT designation yields the supply response of units to higher anticipated
tax credits. Similarly, we can evaluate the importance of the state￿ s preference for
projects located in QCTs by examining the change in the acceptance rate of projects
as a result of QCT status.
In 2003 the QCT criterion was expanded to allow tracts with a poverty rate
exceeding 25 percent to be considered a QCT. The applications data are from 2004
and 2005, so we use the additional information provided by the tract poverty rate
when estimating the e⁄ect of QCT status on applications. Rather than estimating the
discontinuity at the 0.5 income eligibility cuto⁄, we instead include control functions
for both eligible fraction and poverty rate and instrument for QCT status using
indicator variables for whether tracts meet the income and poverty rate requirements.
The reported estimates are IV coe¢ cients that summarize the e⁄ect of QCT status
on application decisions.
Table 7 Panel A displays estimated pure supply responses using applications data
from California, Texas and New Jersey in 2004 and 2005. As with the number of
20installed units, we observe a signi￿cant supply response to the QCT designation.
QCT tracts receive proposals for an extra 17 units on average, controlling for only
the cubic control functions. Adding additional tract controls changes the coe¢ cient
only slightly to 18. We also ￿nd a signi￿cant e⁄ect for the number of proposed LIHTC
units as a fraction of 1990 tract rental units. Much of the higher estimated number of
units is due to more proposed projects, as QCT tracts receive 0.15 more applications.
Units per proposed project also seem to be higher in the tracts qualifying for higher
tax credits, however this is imprecisely estimated.
Table 7 Panel B shows estimated e⁄ects of QCT status on the number of accepted
projects using the same applications data. We estimate that tracts designated as
QCTs see an additional 4 accepted units. This coe¢ cient is similar in magnitude to
that estimated in Table 6 Panel A, though in this case it is not statistically signi￿cant.
We also estimate positive but statistically insigni￿cant e⁄ects of QCT status on
the number of normalized accepted units and number of accepted projects. These
results, combined with those in Panel A, suggest that the discontinuity in supply we
documented in Table 6 is at least in part due to a greater developer willingness to
locate projects in quali￿ed tracts. Evidence in Table 7 also shows that only about
one-quarter of the additional proposals above the threshold are actually accepted,
implying that developers may be reaping large pro￿ts from LIHTC developments.
5.3 Ring Level First Stage Results
As discussed in Section 4.2, we examine the e⁄ects of LIHTC projects using data
on outcomes at the block group level. Table 8 presents ￿rst stage estimates of ￿1
from Equation (12). Each entry is from a separate regression and can be interpreted
as the additional number of projects or units built per census block as a result of
the additional 30 percent tax credit. We impose a radius of 1 km on the inner
ring rather than 0.5 km in order to provide su¢ cient variation to produce tightly
estimated parameters. Standard errors are clustered at the metropolitan area level.
This level of clustering allows for a more general covariance structure of the error
term than would be implied assuming error covariances decay monotonically with
21Euclidean distance. Therefore, standard errors are overstated. Nevertheless, it
should be noted that beyond 2.5 km clustered standard errors imply a weak ￿rst
stage.
Speci￿cation (1) of Table 8 displays the estimated coe¢ cients for each distance
ring, controlling only for the eligible household control function, county ￿xed e⁄ects,
and the number of census blocks in the ring interacted with county ￿xed e⁄ects. The
estimated e⁄ect of tax credits on the number of projects per block varies between
0.005 and 0.016, depending on the ring distance. Column (4) shows analogous es-
timates including a full array of controls. These estimates are similar at between
0.004 and 0.013 additional projects per block because of quali￿ed status. The right
half of Table 8 shows similar estimates for the number of installed units. The esti-
mates displayed in Column (7) show that the higher number of projects corresponds
to between 0.36 and 0.47 additional units per block in response to the greater tax
credit. Again, these estimates change only slightly when the full set of controls are
included, as shown in Column (10).
We also report ￿rst stage estimates for the samples of tracts in gentrifying and
declining neighborhoods. We de￿ne gentrifying areas as those block groups experi-
encing an increase in real housing values between 1980 and 1990. Each subsample
represents roughly half of the full sample. In every ring, gentrifying areas received
more projects and units as a result of the extra tax credit than did declining areas.
This evidence is consistent with the prediction from the model that LIHTC devel-
opers prefer locating projects in gentrifying neighborhoods. The results reported
in Table 8 Columns (1), (4), (7) and (10) form the ￿rst stage for the neighborhood
outcome results discussed in the next section.
We have demonstrated in this section that LIHTC housing supply responds sig-
ni￿cantly across the tax credit discontinuity. Unfortunately, the results presented in
Tables 6-8 do not provide much information on the nature of the LIHTC developers￿
cost function. The reason is that both the size of the tax credit and the probability of
proposal acceptance change across the quali￿ed status discontinuity. Because we do
not observe application data from the relevant period, we cannot distinguish between
these forces. Instead, we focus on using the exogenous variation provided by the
22quali￿ed status discontinuity to study the e⁄ects of low income housing developments
on their surrounding neighborhoods. This is the goal of the next section.
6 LIHTC Projects and Neighborhood Outcomes
In this section, we evaluate the extent to which LIHTC projects in￿ uence neighbor-
hood outcomes. We ￿nd that LIHTC developments have a signi￿cantly negative
impact on neighborhood incomes and increase turnover of owner-occupied house-
holds. Based on evidence that the quantity of owner occupied units changed little
or fell in response to new LIHTC units nearby, we interpret our estimates as captur-
ing shifts in the demand for living in neighborhoods with new LIHTC developments.
Declining median area incomes points to negative peer e⁄ects or stigma of living near
LIHTC projects as potential explanations for these demand shifts.
A standard strategy for evaluating the valuation of a local amenity developed by
Rosen (1974) is to estimate the response in house values to exogenous shocks in the
amenity. We focus primarily on median incomes and owner churn rates as measures
of neighborhood trajectory because they are available at the block group level of
aggregation and provide tighter estimates than are available using housing values. In
a similar paper, Chay and Greenstone (2005) apply Rosen￿ s methodology along with
a regression discontinuity design to examine how homeowners value improvements
in air pollution. They exploit discontinuities in regulatory intensity across counties
to identify the valuation of a change in clean air through changes in housing values.
Our strategy is analogous with the addition of the ring level aggregation developed
above.
6.1 Impacts on Neighborhood Outcomes
Table 9 reports regression discontinuity IV estimates of  1 in Equation (13) for two
outcomes of interest. Table 9 Panel A shows negative responses of block group log
median household income to nearby low income developments. By our estimates,
each new development causes about a 5 percent decline in median household income
23within 1 km. The magnitude of this decline falls with distance to new projects
such that beyond 2.5 km we ￿nd e⁄ects of less than 0.02 in absolute value. It is
important to realize that this shift in the composition of neighborhood population
does not appear to be due in large part to the tenants in LIHTC projects. With
the average project including about 60 units and the average 1 km ring with 1,000
units, tenant incomes would have to be drastically lower than neighborhood incomes
to generate the estimated declines in neighborhood income. Furthermore, projects
built 1 to 1.5 km away show similar e⁄ects on median incomes as projects built in the
inner ring, where the block groups associated with the data on outcomes are located.
We therefore interpret these income changes as primarily re￿ ecting changes in the
composition of non-LIHTC renters and owners.
Table 9 Panel B reports estimated e⁄ects of LIHTC developments on the fraction
of owners who moved between 1990 and 2000 in each block group. Point esti-
mates for inner distance rings are consistently positive at 3.4 percentage points per
project within 1 km, 6.7 percentage points per project between 1 and 1.5 km and 2.9
percentage points per project between 1.5 and 2 km. All of these estimates are sta-
tistically signi￿cant with controls and are stable across speci￿cations. The average
fraction of owners moving between 1990 and 2000 in census tracts with between 40
and 60 percent eligible households is 0.45. Estimates for rings beyond 2 km are not
statistically di⁄erent from 0. This marked increased churn rate of due to LIHTC
projects is consistent with LIHTC projects inducing a downward shift in neighbor-
hood desirability. A similar exercise reveals that the impact of LIHTC projects on
the fraction of renters moving between 1990 and 2000 is not statistically signi￿cant
for any distance ring.12
Understanding the selection process used by developers for site location is crucial
to the interpretation of our results. Evidence from the model and the ￿rst stage
results reported in Table 8 provides support for the claim that LIHTC developers
endeavor to locate in gentrifying areas. As such, a key potential threat to iden-
ti￿cation of the impact of low income housing developments on any neighborhood
outcome is the selection of developments into gentrifying neighborhoods. Such a se-
12The census does not separately tabulate incomes by housing tenure to the block group level.
24lection process would generate a positive correlation between LIHTC developments
and housing values that is not causal.
Table 10 examines the impact of LIHTC projects and units on reported values of
owner-occupied single family homes at various distances from new LIHTC develop-
ments. We use single family homes because this is the housing value measure that is
reported consistently over time by the Census Bureau. Panel A reports coe¢ cients
from OLS regressions of the change in block group log median housing values on the
number of LIHTC projects or units built within the listed distance rings. These
results consistently indicate a positive equilibrium relationship between gentri￿ca-
tion and the location of LIHTC developments regardless of speci￿cation or distance
ring. These estimates exhibit one particularly curious feature that calls into question
their validity. Their magnitudes, while small, hardly attenuate with distance. This
may re￿ ect the fact that the location of gentrifying census block groups is spatially
correlated and some of the determinants of gentri￿cation are unobserved.
Table 10 Panel B reports IV estimates for the e⁄ects on housing values. These
results show that accounting for selection reverses the sign of the estimated coe¢ cient
for the inner distance ring. Depending on the array of control variables included,
each LIHTC project within 1 km is estimated to cause a decline in housing values of
about 2 percent. Like the other outcomes examined, estimated e⁄ects die out beyond
2 km away from block group centroids. While point estimates for housing values
are consistent with LIHTC developments being negatively valued by neighborhoods,
they are not statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 0.
Tables 8-10 report the impacts of LIHTC projects that are new construction or
rehabilitation. Because a sizable fraction of rehabilitations were of public housing
units, one might expect to ￿nd larger e⁄ects from new newly constructed projects
only. We choose not to emphasize these results because both types of projects
vary across the same quali￿ed status discontinuity. Therefore, we cannot isolate
exogenous variation in the two types of projects separately. Nevertheless, evidence
in Table 6 indicates that the signi￿cant response of the higher tax credits comes in
the form of new construction. Therefore, it may not be unreasonable to estimate
Equation (13) using new construction projects only. Doing so produces empirical
25results that are two to four times larger in magnitude than the results reported in
Tables 9 and 10, with similar levels of statistical signi￿cance.
6.2 Accounting For Potential Housing Supply Responses
In order for the tax credit to induce a truly exogenous shift in the public goods
provision in neighborhoods, LIHTC developments must not in￿ uence the aggregate
supply of owner-occupied housing in the relevant market. In other words, in Tables
9 and 10 we hope to capture shifts in demand for housing holding supply ￿xed.
If new low income units cause a shift in the supply of market rate housing, our
estimates would at least partly re￿ ect movements along the housing demand function.
Similarly, if they cause a shift in the composition of the quality of market rate owner-
occupied housing, then our estimate would be partly picking up this shift rather than
local valuation of the change in the local public good. This is one reason to examine
characteristics of owners and the value of owner-occupied units.13 If the markets for
rental units and owner-occupied units are separate or su¢ ciently spatially integrated,
there should be little supply response in the owner-occupied market to shifts in the
supply of rental units.
Using Sinai & Waldfogel￿ s (2005) methodology, we evaluate the potential exis-
tence of local supply responses to the installation of low income units nearby. We
estimate Equation (13) using the change between 1990 and 2000 in owner occupied
units, renter occupied units and total housing units as dependent variables respec-
tively within various rings as dependent variables. Total housing units is the sum of
the other two measures plus vacant units. The housing supply results are reported
in Table 11.
We ￿nd that within 1 km, renter occupied and total housing units increase by
0.23 and 0.16 respectively for every LIHTC unit built, with no signi￿cant response
in the number of owner occupied units. This magnitude is consistent with about
half of LIHTC units being new construction and no owner occupied housing supply
13Indeed, based on the evidence in Table 5 on quality it would be a bad idea to try to infer
valuation based on rents.
26response to LIHTC developments. This supply responses in the rental and total
housing markets fall monotonically as the distance ring is expanded outwards such
that by 3 km out the net impact of new LIHTC units in the neighborhood is not
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 0. If anything, the very local impact on the quantity of
owner occupied units is negative. Given this evidence, we can interpret the housing
values estimates as a lower bound on neighborhoods￿valuation of low income projects.
7 Conclusions
This paper demonstrates that low income housing developments have an impact on
the neighborhoods in which they are located. This impact decays spatially and
reaches as far as 3 km away. There exists a signi￿cant response in the number of
low income units and projects developed in areas that provide additional tax credits
for their development. The discontinuity at 50 percent eligibility of households for
reduced rents generates exogenous variation in the tax credit across similar census
tracts. We use this exogenous assignment across space in the location of low income
developments to identify spatial impulse-response functions showing that LIHTC
developments depress local median household income and increase turnover in owner
occupied housing units within 3 km of these projects. Further, point estimates
indicate that LIHTC projects depress neighborhood median housing values in census
block groups near the quali￿ed status discontinuity. We show the importance of
using the discontinuity in the size of the tax credit as a function of tract incomes to
correct for the selection of LIHTC developments into gentrifying areas.
Our estimates are useful in evaluating the e¢ cacy of the LIHTC program. One
key component of such an evaluation is a better understanding of the supply function
of low income housing, and how this interacts with market supply both in the quality
and quantity dimensions. While we ￿nd that LIHTC units are of higher quality,
as measured by the number of bedrooms, than the average unit housing their target
population, we do not ￿nd that LIHTC developments have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the
age of the rental housing stock in their neighborhoods. As demonstrated by Dunn
et al. (2005) for California, LIHTC projects may cost signi￿cantly more to build
27because of state government regulation. They estimate that California regulation
requiring developers receiving the tax credit to pay the state-regulated prevailing
wage increases project costs by approximately 20 percent.
This paper also contributes to the literature on neighborhood dynamics. Results
indicate that low income housing and residents are negatively valued by their neigh-
bors. The arrival of a new LIHTC development depresses neighborhood incomes
and causes a signi￿cant number of houses to change ownership. While these results
do not allow us to precisely distinguish the mechanism behind these responses, they
indicate that low income developments may be important in impeding gentri￿cation
or precipitating decline.
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Fraction of Households Eligible1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
LIHTC: All Units 318 452 608 792 976 1,170
LIHTC: New Construction Only 144 214 309 425 535 658
Public Housing 2,235 2,434 1,860 1,865 1,861 1,793
Total Subsidized Units 5,331 5,642 6,236 7,065 6,573 6,552
Renter Occupied Housing 33,472 34,150 34,000 34,007 33,996 33,604
Owner Occupied Housing 61,252 63,544 65,487 68,796 72,265 72,238
Total Occupied Units 94,724 97,694 99,487 102,803 106,261 105,842
Fraction of Rentals LIHTC 0.009 0.013 0.018 0.023 0.029 0.035
Fraction of Rentals Public Housing 0.067 0.071 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.053
Table 1: Components of the United States Housing Stock 1987-2003
(thousands)
Notes: All entries except those regarding the LIHTC use data from the American Housing Survey. The LIHTC
numbers assume no projects were taken out of service prior to the listed year.0%-40% 40%-49% 49%-50% 50%-51% 51%-60% 60%-100%
2000
New Construction LIHTC Units 210 28 3 3 25 30
Total LIHTC Units 333 75 7 10 65 112
HUD Units in Any Program (1998)
a 799 323 31 31 287 835
Renter Occupied Housing Units 20,455 3,782 302 298 2,278 2,844
Fraction Renting Below Regulated Level 0.64 0.76 0.78 0.77 0.79 0.85
Owner Occuped Housing Units 47,393 3,698 242 210 1,408 997
1990
New Construction LIHTC Units 20 40013
Total LIHTC Units 42 15 1 3 10 27
Renter Occupied Housing Units 18,257 3,608 293 289 2,230 2,974
Fraction Renting Below Regulated Level 0.49 0.66 0.70 0.69 0.71 0.80
Owner Occuped Housing Units 39,023 3,472 233 206 1,391 1,019
Difference
New Construction LIHTC Units 190 24 3 3 23 27
Renter Occupied Housing Units 2,199 173 9 9 48 -130
Fraction of Rental Growth LIHTC 0.09 0.14 0.30 0.27 0.49 -0.21
Count of 1990 Census Tracts 33,203 4,713 377 357 2,737 3,894
Notes: Sample includes housing units in 1990-definition metropolitan areas only. Numbers are based on authors' calculations using the LIHTC and
"A Picture of Subsidized Households" data sets available from HUD in addition to US census tract data.
Table 2: HUD's Involvement in the Housing Market 1990-2000
(all housing numbers in thousands)
Percent of Households Eligible for Rent Reduction0%-40% 40%-49% 49%-50% 50%-51% 51%-60% 60%-100% RD Coeff
LIHTC Projects Proposed & Built 1994 to 1999
Total Units 6.2 7.7 8.8 16.2 13.7 14.1 6.4*
Low Income Units 5.5 7.4 8.6 15.7 12.9 13.1 5.6*
Projects 0.07 0.11 0.15 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.06*
Units Per Project 84.9 68.3 60.1 87.0 66.9 61.1 12.20
1990 Census Demographics
Population 4,608         4,045         3,849         3,856         3,766         3,044         -252*
Housing Units 1,868         1,677         1,557         1,560         1,483         1,176         -116*
Percent Black 0.08           0.22           0.29           0.30           0.37           0.53           0.01
Percent High School Graduate 0.81           0.65           0.61           0.60           0.57           0.50           -0.01
Poverty Rate 0.08           0.20           0.25           0.26           0.30           0.45           0.00
Median Household Income 38,695       22,754       20,142       19,548       17,729       12,015       57
Log Median Household Income 10.51         10.01         9.89           9.86           9.76           9.33           -0.01*
Renter Tenure < 10 Years 0.50           0.42           0.41           0.40           0.39           0.36           -0.01
Owner Tenure < 10 Years 0.89           0.86           0.85           0.86           0.84           0.81           0.00
1990 Census Housing Characteristics
Average Age, Owner Occupied 27.81         36.58         37.52         38.26         39.54         41.36         0.31
Average Age, Renter Occupied 26.24         31.83         32.49         32.30         33.42         33.39         -0.35
Avg. # of Units, Owner Occ. 2.17           2.42           2.53           2.33           2.68           3.21           0.09
Avg. # of Units, Renter Occ. 8.37           9.19           8.85           9.49           9.73           13.14         0.60
Fraction Detached, Owner Occ. 0.80           0.69           0.64           0.68           0.65           0.60           0.02*
Fraction Detached, Renter Occ. 0.35           0.28           0.27           0.26           0.25           0.18           -0.00
Median Housing Value 124,749     80,232       76,576       69,920       70,084       59,546       -137
Log Median Housing Value 11.53 11.07 10.98 10.94 10.91 10.71 0.01
Median Gross Rent 545            414            397            393            385            323            -3
Log Median Gross Rent 6.25 5.98 5.94 5.93 5.91 5.71 -.010
ΔLog Med. Housing Value 80-90 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.09 -0.01
Percent of Households Eligible for Rent Reduction
Table 3: Average Characteristics of Areas by Eligibility Status
Notes: Each element in the table is the mean of the variable listed at left over the tracts in the relevant income eligibility
group. The "RD Coeff" column reports the coefficient on an indicator for greater than 0.5 in an OLS regression of the
variable listed at left on a cubic in eligible fraction interacted with the 0.5 cutoff indicator controlling for county fixed effects.
Only tracts with between 20 and 80 percent eligible households are used to calculate numbers in the final column. *
indicates significance at the 10 percent level.Non-DDAs DDAs Total
< 40 Percent Eligible Tracts
LIHTC Low Income Units as a Fraction of . . . 141,768 42,285 184,053
Rental Units in 1990 0.012 0.007 0.010
Rental Units < 10 Years Old in 2000 0.06 0.06 0.06
Total Units < 10 Years Old in 2000 0.01 0.02 0.01
40-50 Percent Eligible Tracts
LIHTC Low Income Units as a Fraction of . . . 29,018 8,882 37,900
Rental Units in 1990 0.012 0.006 0.010
Rental Units < 10 Years Old in 2000 0.16 0.10 0.13
Total Units < 10 Years Old in 2000 0.06 0.04 0.05
50-60 Percent Eligible Tracts
LIHTC Low Income Units as a Fraction of . . . 30,859 10,140 40,999
Rental Units in 1990 0.020 0.010 0.016
Rental Units < 10 Years Old in 2000 0.29 0.15 0.24
Total Units < 10 Years Old in 2000 0.16 0.09 0.14
>60 Percent Eligible Tracts
LIHTC Low Income Units as a Fraction of . . . 34,152 16,727 50,879
Rental Units in 1990 0.018 0.015 0.017
Rental Units < 10 Years Old in 2000 0.31 0.21 0.27
Total Units < 10 Years Old in 2000 0.21 0.16 0.19
Table 4: Low Income Units and the Quantity of Housing
Notes: DDA stands for Difficult Development Area. Calculations are based on aggregates in the given group.
Numbers in the Total column reflect information in the preceding columns in addition to data from a few
metropolitan areas for which DDA status is not available.Percent
Eligible 0123 4 + Mean
0-40 0.03 0.29 0.45 0.20 0.03 1.90
40-50 0.04 0.33 0.42 0.17 0.04 1.83
50-60 0.07 0.24 0.44 0.20 0.05 1.93
60-100 0.08 0.30 0.35 0.22 0.06 1.89
All 0.04 0.29 0.43 0.20 0.04 1.90
0-40 0.05 0.30 0.42 0.19 0.04 1.89
40-50 0.07 0.34 0.39 0.16 0.03 1.76
50-60 0.09 0.36 0.37 0.16 0.03 1.70
60-100 0.11 0.36 0.34 0.16 0.04 1.66
All 0.06 0.32 0.40 0.18 0.04 1.83
0-40 0.02 0.22 0.46 0.25 0.05 2.10
40-50 0.02 0.32 0.46 0.17 0.03 1.85
50-60 0.04 0.37 0.44 0.14 0.02 1.74
60-100 0.06 0.43 0.38 0.12 0.02 1.62
All 0.03 0.34 0.44 0.17 0.03 1.81
Notes: The results for Panel C are calculated by examining the distribution of bedrooms for
renting families in the listed income group. Income groups are assigned based on metropolitan
area of residence and family composition.
Table 5: The Distribution of Bedrooms in LIHTC and Market Units
Panel A: LIHTC Units Built 1990-2000
Panel B: Tract Level Data
Panel C: Census Microdata
Number of Bedrooms1234
Panel A:  All Project Types
Number of LIHTC Low 5.954 5.721 5.844 5.562
Income Units (2.563)* (2.522)* (2.451)* (2.496)*
Number of LIHTC Low 0.020 0.020 0.012 0.011
Income Units/1990 Rentals (0.009)* (0.009)* (0.004)** (0.004)*
Number of LIHTC Low 0.064 0.059 0.062 0.061
Income Projects (0.030)* (0.029)* (0.028)* (0.028)*
Units Per Project 18.773 10.497 9.913 6.014
(12.494) (12.001) (11.044) (10.982)
Panel B:  New Construction Projects
Number of LIHTC Low 4.291 3.969 4.073 3.975
Income Units (1.433)** (1.335)** (1.408)** (1.510)**
Number of LIHTC Low 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.008
Income Units/1990 Rentals (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)**
Number of LIHTC Low 0.050 0.047 0.048 0.049
Income Projects (0.021)* (0.018)* (0.020)* (0.019)*
Units Per Project 20.210 13.698 10.113 11.396
(13.330) (14.083) (14.801) (14.849)
Panel C:  Rehabilitation Projects
Number of LIHTC Low 1.663 1.752 1.771 1.587
Income Units (2.161) (2.055) (2.056) (2.075)
Number of LIHTC Low 0.012 0.011 0.004 0.003
Income Units/1990 Rentals (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003)
Number of LIHTC Low 0.014 0.012 0.013 0.013
Income Projects (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Units Per Project 21.345 12.691 15.642 7.718
(17.910) (22.491) (21.443) (23.381)
Included Controls:
Cubic Polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls No No Yes Yes
Housing Controls No No No Yes
County Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Table 6: Coefficients on Eligible > .5 for Various Primary Outcomes
Standard errors are calculated from 500 block bootstrap samples drawn using MSA level
clusters. Sample includes all census tracts in metropolitan areas excluding Washington,
DC. Demographic controls are fraction white, fraction black, fraction hispanic, log median
family income, log per capita income, and the poverty rate from 1990. Housing controls
are vacancy rate, the fraction of housing units that are rentals, log median value, log rent,
log units, average owner-occupied age, average renter-occupied age, fraction owner-
occupied more than 50 years old, fraction renter occupied more than 50 years old,
average size and fraction over 50 units.1234
Panel A:  Proposed projects
Number of Proposed LIHTC Low 16.611 16.819 18.023 18.368
    Income Units (6.457)** (6.476)*** (6.865)*** (6.876)***
Number of Proposed LIHTC Low 0.043 0.044 0.046 0.047
    Income Units/2000 Rentals (0.021)** (0.021)** (0.023)** (0.023)**
Number of Proposed LIHTC Projects 0.143 0.140 0.146 0.148
(0.073)* (0.073)* (0.077)* (0.077)*
Proposed Units Per Project 56.884 40.347 77.391 78.378
(56.745) (56.888) (56.225) (62.081)
Panel B:  Accepted projects
Number of Accepted LIHTC Low 3.478 3.726 4.052 4.166
    Income Units (3.060) (3.059) (3.207) (3.197)
Number of Accepted LIHTC Low 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003
    Income Units/2000 Rentals (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Number of Accepted LIHTC Projects 0.037 0.039 0.038 0.037
(0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039)
Accepted Units Per Project 9.473 -59.874 -34.794 -42.007
(135.159) (86.589) (66.333) (75.870)
Included Controls:
Cubic Polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls No No Yes Yes
Housing Controls No No No Yes
County Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Table 7: Qualified Census Tract Status and LIHTC Applications
Notes: The sample includes all census tracts in Texas, California and New Jersey. Proposal data is
from 2004 and 2005. The rules governing qualified status in these years are the same as for the 1990s
with the addition to the fact that qualified status is granted to tracts with poverty rates of over 25 percent.
Therefore, controls include cubic polynomials interacted with being above the qualified thresholds in
both eligible fraction and poverty rate plus an indicator for whether the tract qualifies. Additional control
variables are the same as those used in Table 6. The reported coefficients are IV estimates of the
effect of QCT status, using dummies for whether the tract qualifies based on eligible fraction and the
poverty rate thresholds as separate instruments.Distance
Ring (km) All Gentrifying Declining All Gentrifying Declining All Gentrifying Declining All Gentrifying Declining
123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2
0 - 1 0.0050 0.0073 0.0015 0.0040 0.0066 0.0014 0.36 0.44 0.16 0.28 0.40 0.15
(0.0023) (0.0033) (0.0013) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0013) (0.09) (0.13) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.07)
1 - 1.5 0.0052 0.0042 0.0015 0.0032 0.0028 0.0014 0.41 0.38 0.15 0.32 0.34 0.15
(0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.12) (0.13) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.10)
1.5 - 2 0.0087 0.0099 0.0007 0.0067 0.0086 0.0007 0.41 0.49 0.12 0.34 0.46 0.12
(0.0051) (0.0060) (0.0022) (0.0039) (0.0047) (0.0022) (0.16) (0.21) (0.09) (0.13) (0.18) (0.09)
2 - 2.5 0.0129 0.0137 0.0008 0.0103 0.0124 0.0008 0.44 0.40 0.15 0.33 0.34 0.14
(0.0097) (0.0098) (0.0015) (0.0077) (0.0085) (0.0015) (0.26) (0.28) (0.08) (0.20) (0.25) (0.08)
2.5 - 3 0.0159 0.0191 0.0011 0.0132 0.0180 0.0011 0.47 0.47 0.19 0.38 0.42 0.18
(0.0134) (0.0162) (0.0017) (0.0111) (0.0150) (0.0017) (0.31) (0.38) (0.10) (0.25) (0.35) (0.10)
3 - 3.5 0.0125 0.0190 0.0000 0.0110 0.0177 0.0000 0.32 0.53 0.07 0.30 0.48 0.08
(0.0098) (0.0140) (0.0016) (0.0087) (0.0126) (0.0016) (0.19) (0.30) (0.09) (0.17) (0.27) (0.09)
3.5 - 4 0.0094 0.0136 0.0009 0.0089 0.0118 0.0011 0.32 0.49 0.15 0.31 0.42 0.15
(0.0078) (0.0105) (0.0013) (0.0068) (0.0087) (0.0012) (0.15) (0.24) (0.09) (0.13) (0.20) (0.09)
Obs. 106,098 48,338 47,341 100,533 47,278 46,619 106,098 48,338 47,341 100,533 47,278 46,619
Notes: Entries list coefficients and standard errors on number of eligible blocks in each listed ring in separate regressions of the number of projects or units on a cubic
polynomial in eligibility fraction interacted with eligibility fraction greater than .5, the number of census blocks in the ring and county fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the metropolitan area level. All controls from the most complete specifications in Tables 9-11 are included. Coefficients can be interpreted as the additional
projects or units built per block as a result of being eligible for the higher tax credit. Obs. refers to the number of observations (block groups) used to estimate regressions
in the first row. Regressions in lower rows include more observations because fewer rings are made up only of tracts with 0 households. Only block groups in tracts with
between 20 percent and 80 percent of households eligible for reduced rent are included.  All block groups of greater than 4π sq. km are excluded.
LIHTC Projects Number LIHTC Units
Table 8: First Stage Results for Rings - Block Groups
County FE Only County FE + Other Controls County FE Only County FE + Other ControlsDistance
Ring (km)
1234
0 - 1 -0.036 -0.050 -0.054 -0.078
(0.025) (0.026) (0.038) (0.039)
1 - 1.5 -0.046 -0.040 -0.064 -0.048
(0.031) (0.038) (0.042) (0.045)
1.5 - 2 -0.027 -0.029 -0.058 -0.058
(0.017) (0.017) (0.037) (0.035)
2 - 2.5 -0.031 -0.038 -0.087 -0.109
(0.012) (0.013) (0.035) (0.037)
2.5 - 3 -0.021 -0.018 -0.067 -0.059
(0.011) (0.010) (0.033) (0.034)
3 - 3.5 -0.005 0.020 -0.018 0.067
(0.015) (0.014) (0.054) (0.048)
3.5 - 4 -0.059 0.012 -0.165 0.033




0 - 1 0.018 0.034 0.028 0.054
(0.014) (0.015) (0.021) (0.023)
1 - 1.5 0.041 0.067 0.056 0.082
(0.019) (0.025) (0.024) (0.027)
1.5 - 2 0.031 0.029 0.067 0.058
(0.010) (0.011) (0.023) (0.021)
2 - 2.5 0.006 0.007 0.016 0.018
(0.007) (0.008) (0.020) (0.021)
2.5 - 3 0.003 0.005 0.011 0.015
(0.006) (0.006) (0.019) (0.019)
3 - 3.5 -0.010 -0.004 -0.036 -0.015
(0.008) (0.008) (0.029) (0.027)
3.5 - 4 -0.040 -0.028 -0.107 -0.075
(0.013) (0.011) (0.036) (0.030)
Included Controls:
Demographics No Yes No Yes
Housing No Yes No Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 9: Estimated RD Effects of LIHTC Developments
Panel A: Log Median Household Income
LIHTC Projects 100s of LIHTC Units
Notes: Entries list coefficients and standard errors on the number of projects or
100s of units in each listed ring in separate regressions of change in log median
household income or owner turnover on the controls listed at the bottom of the
table. The aggregate cubic polynomial interacted with census fixed effects always
enters as a series of control variables. Included controls are the same as those
used for Table 8.
Panel B: Fraction of Owners Moving in Previous 10 Years
on Neighborhood Outcomes
LIHTC Projects 100s of LIHTC UnitsDistance
Ring (km)
1234
0 - 1 0.012 0.010 0.029 0.024
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
1 - 1.5 0.012 0.009 0.020 0.013
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
1.5 - 2 0.012 0.010 0.022 0.014
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
2 - 2.5 0.012 0.010 0.022 0.015
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
2.5 - 3 0.010 0.007 0.019 0.012
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
3 - 3.5 0.009 0.007 0.019 0.012
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
3.5 - 4 0.007 0.005 0.015 0.009




0 - 1 -0.034 -0.026 -0.038 -0.049
(0.033) (0.036) (0.052) (0.048)
1 - 1.5 0.010 0.054 0.062 0.013
(0.048) (0.060) (0.067) (0.063)
1.5 - 2 0.009 0.018 0.034 0.017
(0.025) (0.027) (0.049) (0.048)
2 - 2.5 0.026 0.030 0.071 0.062
(0.021) (0.022) (0.054) (0.050)
2.5 - 3 -0.014 -0.009 -0.025 -0.037
(0.016) (0.016) (0.044) (0.043)
3 - 3.5 -0.047 -0.036 -0.103 -0.135
(0.019) (0.019) (0.055) (0.056)
3.5 - 4 -0.070 -0.060 -0.099 -0.119
(0.034) (0.035) (0.057) (0.056)
Included Controls:
Demographics No Yes No Yes
Housing No Yes No Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Panel A reports OLS estimates of coefficients on number of projects and
100s of units within listed distance rings. Regressions producing these results do
not control for eligible household fraction in any way. Panel B reports analogous
IV coefficients estimated in the same way as all coefficients reported in Table 9.
The dependent variable is the change in log value of owner occupied single
family homes between 1990 and 2000. Control variables match those listed in
the notes to Table 6.
Panel B: RD Results
LIHTC Projects 100s of LIHTC Units
Table 10: Estimated Effects of LIHTC Developments
Panel A: OLS Results
LIHTC Projects 100s of LIHTC Units
on Housing Valuse 1990-2000Owner Renter Total
Distance Occupied Occupied Housing
Ring (km) Units Units Units
0 - 1 -0.054 0.231 0.161
(0.125) (0.119) (0.186)
0 - 1.5 0.068 0.144 0.211
(0.056) (0.053) (0.084)
0 - 2 0.023 0.091 0.113
(0.038) (0.036) (0.056)
0 - 2.5 0.011 0.079 0.092
(0.032) (0.030) (0.048)
0 - 3 -0.018 0.090 0.067
(0.036) (0.035) (0.054)
0 - 3.5 -0.107 0.060 -0.088
(0.071) (0.065) (0.104)
0 - 4 -0.238 0.055 -0.404
(0.193) (0.151) (0.305)
Table 11: Effects of LIHTC Units
Reported regression discontinuity coefficients are on
number of low income units in each ring. Dependent
variables are changes between 1990 and 2000 in counts
of the variables listed at the top of the columns within each
of the rings listed at left. Controls are the same as those
used in Table 9.  Total housing units includes vacant units.
on the Quantity of Housing0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
Panel A: All Project Types
Number of LIHTC Low 1.979 -0.735 5.562 -3.112 4.306
Income Units (1.595) (1.495) (2.496)* (2.871) (4.975)
Number of LIHTC Low 0.002 0.013 0.011 -0.003 0.032
Income Units/1990 Rentals (0.005) (0.012) (0.004)* (0.005) (0.026)
Number of LIHTC Low 0.041 -0.018 0.061 -0.044 0.047
Income Projects (0.019)* (0.018) (0.028)* (0.036) (0.068)
Units Per Project -1.073 1.981 6.014 -0.403 -0.376
(12.209) (10.720) (10.982) (9.367) (20.243)
Panel B: New Construction
Number of LIHTC Low 0.908 -0.127 3.975 -1.342 1.570
Income Units (1.161) (1.019) (1.510)** (1.833) (3.155)
Number of LIHTC Low 0.003 0.002 0.008 -0.004 0.024
Income Units/1990 Rentals (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)** (0.003) (0.025)
Number of LIHTC Low 0.023 -0.015 0.049 -0.019 -0.000
Income Projects (0.017) (0.014) (0.019)* (0.020) (0.039)
Units Per Project -10.308 8.856 11.396 7.252 29.718
(15.213) (12.131) (14.849) (12.117) (45.175)
Panel C: Rehabilitation Projects
Number of LIHTC Low 1.071 -0.608 1.587 -1.770 2.737
Income Units (1.006) (1.118) (2.075) (2.321) (3.850)
Number of LIHTC Low -0.001 0.011 0.003 0.001 0.007
Income Units/1990 Rentals (0.002) (0.013) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
Number of LIHTC Low 0.018 -0.003 0.013 -0.025 0.047
Income Projects (0.008)* (0.011) (0.020) (0.030) (0.060)
Units Per Project -14.345 -6.689 7.718 -2.048 -6.068
(23.063) (23.105) (23.381) (12.085) (21.055)
Included Controls:
Cubic Polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Housing Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table A1: Estimates of Placebo Treatments at Different Eligibility Thresholds
Standard errors are calculated from 500 block bootstrap samples, allowing for clustering at the county
level. Sample includes all census tracts in metropolitan areas excluding Washington, DC. Demographic
controls are fraction white, fraction black, fraction hispanic, log median family income, log per capita
income, and the poverty rate from 1990. Housing controls are vacancy rate, the fraction of housing units
that are rentals, log median value log rent, log units, average owner-occupied age, average renter-
occupied age, fraction owner-occupied more than 50 years old, fraction renter occupied more than 50
years old, average size and fraction over 50 units.